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The Fight against Crime and/or the
Protection of Privacy: A Thorny Debate!1
YVES POULLET
ABSTRACT This article analyses a recent legislative provision adopted by the
Belgian legislator imposing on all communication service providers the require-
ment that they retain traffic data for a minimum period of 12 months, in addition
to the recent European debates about Echelon and traffic data retention in the
light of the requirements of Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The equilibrium between state
security requirements and privacy protection imperatives leads the proposal of a
certain number of limitations, as regards to cyber-surveillance by governmental
authorities in order to maintain the efficient functioning of our democracies.
Those prepared to sacrifice a little liberty for the sake of security, deserve neither the one
nor the other.
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
The history of Article 109b, E, of the law of 11 March 1991, intended to reform certain
public entities, testifies to the fear of Belgian society with regard to attacks on personal or
material security, attacks made that much easier by the spread of new communication and
information technologies. This law, which was inserted into the recent law on cybercrime
in response to the current desire for a more secure world, imposes the collaboration of
information society providers with the police. In the context of the aftermath of the attack
on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, this particular Belgian legislation is being
cited within the European debate as a model.
Our intention is to offer a brief commentary of the provision, while simultaneously
taking a position in the ‘data protection versus privacy’ debate. To this end, our reflections
will
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draw on numerous sources within the reports and judgements issued by the Commission
on recent legislation targeting cyber-criminality or bearing on the interception or tapping
of telephones.2
The new provision requires, under threat of sanctions, that network operators and
telecommunications service providers conserve call and caller data from within the frontiers
of the European Union (EU) for a minimum period of 12 months.
In addition to this, a Royal decree on the protection of privacy, consulted upon within
the Council of Ministers following an opinion delivered by the Commission, and setting
down the time limit and type of data that may be conserved, has never been enacted.
Our examination of this provision takes the following course:
• Section 1 engenders an analytical description of the implications of the text: what do
we understand by ‘operators’ or ‘service providers’? What ‘data’ may or must be
conserved?
• Section 2 touches on the current European debate concerning the fight against
cybercrime, a debate that the fall-out from the events of 11 September 2001 has
revived. In particular, it deals with the discussions held throughout the process leading
to the adoption of the privacy and the electronic communications sector directive3, and
the debates regarding the provisions adopted in this regard by the European Conven-
tion on Cybercrime.4
• Finally, Section 3 is a critique of the legal provision itself, the object of this study, from
the point of view of the principles of privacy enunciated in both Belgian and
international European texts.
1. The Significance of the Provision
The legal provision5 completes a recently introduced text. The law of 11 June 1998
modifying the law of 30 June 1994 relative to the protection of privacy from wire-tapping,
examination and recording of private communications and telecommunications, had in fact
already introduced the obligation of certain communications service providers to collabor-
ate with judicial authorities. Under that law, the King determines, in accordance with the
opinion given by the Commission for the Protection of Privacy, transmitted in a post-delib-
eration judgement issued by the Council of Ministers, ‘the technical means whereby
network operators and service providers must permit the detection, localisation, tapping,
examination and recording of private telecommunications’.6
The main fear7 expressed by the Commission for the Protection of Privacy with regard
to this law was the risk of the introduction of a general regime of exploratory surveillance:
contingent upon the limits that might be introduced under the Royal decree, the judicial
authorities are in effect granted the right to extract information enabling general ex-
ploratory surveillance from data banks maintained by operators and service providers.
Such a regime of general exploratory surveillance is forbidden under the principles
established by the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of Article 8 of the
European Convention.8
The addition introduced by the law of 28 November 2000 to section 1 §2 article 109b,
E considerably amplifies the means granted to police authorities inasmuch as it allows them
not only to access real-time, but also pre-recorded communications data. Indeed, telecom-
munications service providers are obliged, under threat of penal sanction,9 to make data
conserved within EU frontiers10 available to the authorities for a ‘minimum’ of 12 months.11
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The provision targets all ‘telecommunications operators and service providers’. The term
‘network operators’, implies all providers of traditional transport and routing message
services, whether public or private networks, such as intranets owned by particular
administrations or organizations, regardless of whether these involve mobile telephony,
radio broadcast, satellite, cable or other media.
The term ‘communications service providers12 ‘further enlarges the provision’s frame of
application, implying as it does those myriad of providers offering internet services (access
providers, message services, search engines, internet portals, discussion forums, etc.) or
those who offer added value services, such as cryptography, trusted third parties or online
banking. Even the owners of ‘cyber cafés’ and anonymization servers, etc., are included.
It is up to the Royal decree13 envisaged by the law to determine, from within this list,
those categories of services genuinely targeted by the legal provision. We may observe that
the greater part of these ‘operators’ or ‘providers’ have no a priori reason whatsoever to
conserve this data beyond termination of the actual connection.14 Indeed, a good number
of these services are free of charge. In other words, the only finality for the conservation
of such data is in the context of a need to bring evidence in the event of an infraction being
pursued. Such a conclusion has a bearing, both on the foundation for the legitimacy of such
processes, as well as on the statute of those persons expected to carry out such conser-
vation.
The data to be conserved will also be fixed by Royal decree. These will be, depending
on the terms of enactment, telecommunications media15 call data and service user
identification data.
The list of such data is infinite.16 The ‘Discussion Paper’ prepared by the Commission
services for the meeting of experts, called on the 6 November 2002 to consider the question
of data retention, lists more than 60 types of data that might thus be considered for
collection and conservation.17 We may note, as has Dinant,18 that these traces are currently
multiplying thanks to the increasingly generalized use of communication services in all
sectors of professional and non-professional life. Furthermore, the identity of those conserv-
ing the information, as well as the nature, purpose and location of their archives, is
becoming increasingly opaque to those individual citizens who are leaving their coordinates
in the tender hands of networks, as often as not without their knowledge or permission.
Thus, when navigating via a search engine such as Lycos Altavista and visiting a site
hosted by any given server, without even considering the numerous invisible operations
possible, the typical internaut leaves a trail—with the operators of networks his trajectory
follows, with access providers and with the various servers hosting the sites visited. The
type of traces left within the given sample are varied. While the network operator conserves
traces of network traffic (the number calling or rather the address of the message recipient),
the access provider may be logging a trace of the various applications called on by the
internaut’s information system: the different sites visited, the pages called-up and the route
taken, the length of each visit and, of course, the characteristics of the internaut’s
configuration. A similar wealth of information will be found with the search engine
operator and with the cyber-marketing company with which that search engine is connec-
ted by invisible hyperlink.
The European texts, the Directive itself and the European Convention of the Council of
Europe, marks out certain categories from within this data. The Council of Europe
distinguishes between ‘traffic-related data’ and ‘subscriber-related data’, and the EU
between traffic and location data. We shall return later to the importance of such
distinctions.19
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2. The European Debate on the Obligation to Conserve Traffic-related Data
Two European bodies are either currently discussing, or have finished their discussions on
the obligation to conserve communication data and its corollary, the obligation laid upon
private bodies, required to conserve data, to collaborate with public bodies such as the
police and judicial authorities.
(a) The Council of Europe
On 8 November 2001, the Council of Europe adopted the first international treaty on
‘cybercrime’.20 It was presented for signing by the other Member or non-Member21 States
on 23 November that same year at the Conference of Budapest.
The text is based on Recommendation No. R(95)13 from the Ministers’ committee
regarding problems of penal procedure relative to information technology.22 It is the fruit
of work carried out by a committee created in 1997, which was given the task of drawing
up a convention on cybercrime in cyberspace designed to reinforce international cooper-
ation.
The Recommendation limited itself to prescribing ‘specific obligations … for service
providers offering telecommunications services to the public at large, via public or private
communication networks, to deliver information necessary to the identification of a user,
when required by the competent authorities charged with an inquiry’. In other words, it
essentially involves permitting police authorities, within the context of an inquiry, to
demand the identity of a client on the basis of a TCP/IP address, a mobile phone or
fixed-line telephone number. The 2001 Convention contains various obligations for the
signatory States, assuming, as Article 15 reminds us, that the installation of the intended
measures is made subject to the ‘conditions and safeguards envisaged by their internal laws
which must assure an adequate protection of Human Rights and Liberties’. This general
principle clearly involves the respect of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and of any jurisprudence based upon or interpreting that Article.
The first obligation concerns the ‘rapid’ conservation of specific data, including traffic
data stored by computer systems. It is incumbent upon those people in control or
possession of such data, and Article 16 envisages this rapid conservation as being for a
maximum, though renewable, term of 90 days.23 This provision is far from having the
general range of its Belgian counterpart. It arrogates, within the framework of a specific
infraction, the right to the relevant authorities to order a person already in possession of
certain data to conserve it against the possibility of it otherwise disappearing. It does not
authorize the State to impose supplementary data conservation obligations upon operators
or providers and certainly not to operate such conservation as a general regime for all uses
of their services.24
Article 17 makes plain that the conservation and divulgence of data on the basis of
Article 16 concerns a quantity of traffic-related data sufficient to permit the ‘identification
of service providers and the route by which the communication was transmitted’.
Alongside this first prescription, Article 18 of the Convention obliges the Member States
to introduce such measures as enable the competent authorities to order a service provider
to ‘communicate subscriber-related data’ in their possession or under their control. Article
18 envisages that by ‘subscriber-related data’ it should be exclusively understood as data
‘bearing on the identification of persons using the services supplied by operators and on the
technical characteristics of the communications assured by these latter. On no account may
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such data bear upon the content of correspondence exchanged nor of information con-
sultable, in whatever form that may be, within the context of these communications.’
One may note that the obligation to divulge thus envisaged only concerns data already
treated by providers in the normal course of their activities and only targets so-called
connection data, that is to say data relative to the identity of persons connected to the service,
to the exclusion of so-called traffic data, such as the list of sites visited, the length of the
connection, etc.
This exclusion of data relating to the use made of a service is the fruit of long debates and,
in particular, the marked opposition of a series of American and European associations for
the defence of civil liberties25 as well as a European group for the protection of persons with
regard to the processing of data of a personal character, known as the Article 29 Group.26
(b) The European Union
The EU position, which has always privileged a ‘protection of civil liberties’ approach, has
found itself considerably called into question in the aftermath of the events of 11 September
2001 on American soil.
As a particularly apt illustration of the initial EU approach, we may cite the reaction of
numerous European instances upon discovering the existence of the satellite-tapping
network known as ECHELON.27 This network, for the most part managed by the USA,
enables their intelligence services to intercept and analyse all or certain communications
transiting via satellite, whether telephonic or electronic. Certainly, reactions to the STOA
report of 199828 were slow to come at first, owing in part to the participation of the UK
in the Echelon network, the presence of listening posts in Germany and England and,
finally, the existence of a competing network run by the French. However, thanks mainly
to the intervention of the European data protection group,29 a rising wave of reactions
would lead in time to a resolution voted by the European Parliament on 5 September 2001,
in the wake of the Schmidt report. Here we may notably remark, among their consider-
ations, the inclusion of a condemnation of interception practices not in conformity with the
principles of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The European concern to protect the private lives of citizens in cyberspace is based on the
recognition, within Europe, of data protection as a fundamental right30 as much as, outside
Europe, it is based on a modern vision of the principle of sovereignty.31 However, it must
take into account the imperatives of security and, in particular, the imperatives of the war
on cybercrime. Since the treaty of Amsterdam, initiatives founded on the so-called 3rd
Pillar,32 that of intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice, both civil and penal,
as well as internal affairs, are possible at the European level. This necessity for equilibrium
is affirmed by a communiqué of the Commission Communication dated 26 January 2001:33
‘The present communication questions the need of an initiative in order to define a global
policy, and analyses the different ways to achieve it in the context of broader objectives.
These are Information Society and the notion of a common space of liberty, security and
justice in order to better the necessity of information infrastructures and the fight against
computer viruses, in full respect of fundamental rights, according to E.U. commitments’.
Applying the principle of a counterweight to the ‘obligation to conserve’ certain
traffic-related data, the communiqué distinguishes those processed by service operators and
providers in the context of their normal activities of invoicing34 and data whose processing
is solely for the purposes of a criminal inquiry. With regard to the first category, the
Commission considers that the Member States may adopt legal measures aimed at limiting
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the range of an obligation to erase traffic-related data whenever such a limitation consti-
tutes a necessary measure for the prevention, investigation, detection and pursuit either of
criminal infractions or of the unauthorized use of telecommunications systems.35
With regard to the second category of data, the Commission considers that their
recording and conservation cannot be justified other than for exceptional reasons and for
a very limited period.
To this end, the Commission cites a resolution of the European Parliament that in a
specific instance, namely the fight against child pornography, permits the conservation of
traffic-related data for a period of 3 months as a quite exceptional case.36
The 11 September attacks and the American government’s insistence that the European
States improve their collaboration in the fight against terrorism and in particular review
their mechanisms for the protection of electronic data in order to ensure a more effective
front against terrorist organizations operating notably with the help of modern communi-
cation networks.37 We observe that ‘with all the urgency of a notion at war’ and in record
time, the White House has driven through Congress a number of legislative texts paving the
way for an effective campaign against terrorism, in particular the Patriot Act,38 of which
certain provisions concern phone tapping.39 With regard to these, we may note: that the US
provisions do not involve any obligation upon communications service providers to
conserve traffic-related data for any period longer than that necessitated by the normal
requirements of the service they offer;40 that the communication of such stored data is not
imposed but is made voluntarily in the framework of ‘codes of conduct’ drawn-up between
these providers and the security or judicial authorities and, finally; that the obligation to
communicate traffic-related data is surrounded by procedural guarantees, criminal law and
civil law sanctions that can be levied in the case of non-respect of the legal conditions
imposed by the text41 and may under no pretence give access to a communications’
content.42 Finally, pressured by the civil liberties defence lobby, the law envisages a
‘Sunset’43 clause, limiting the validity of its legal provisions to a term of four years.
The discussion underway since 2000 on a revision of the 97/66 directive on the processing
of personal data and data protection in the telecommunications sector44 should provide the
principle framework for the European reply to this American request. This directive proposal
was originally embedded within a series of proposals aimed at reforming the European
telecommunications regulation45 in order to adapt it to developments both in technology and
in the telecommunications service market. The proposal, on reaching the draft stage, became
the object of a ‘Common Position decreed by the Council with a view to adopting the
directive’.46 This directive regarding the processing of data of a personal nature and the
protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector was finally adopted on 12 July 2002.47
The initial proposal enunciated the principles under which traffic- and location-related
data could not be conserved or used, other than for the purposes of invoicing and
interconnection, without the express consent of the client within the framework of a
value-added service offer. This initial proposal reiterated the solution already affirmed by
the 97/66 directive. During the discussions which preceded the dramatic events of 11
September, the Council of Ministers telecommunications meeting of 27 June was already
sympathetic48 to the calls emanating from various police authorities, and accepted the
addition of a phrase to section 10 of the preamble:49 ‘this directive does not affect the right
of Member States to carry out legitimate interceptions of electronic communications or to
take other measures such as ordering the conservation of traffic-related or localisation data
for a limited period if such conservation is necessary and justified for reasons in conformity
with the general principles of Community law.’
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The aftermath of the attacks provoked vital discussions on this issue. On 20 September
the meeting of European Justice and Internal Affairs Ministers adopted conclusions
requiring all telecommunications providers to conserve data, grant police authorities access
to it ‘for the purposes of criminal investigation’ and calling on the European Commission
(EC) to revise European legislation in such a way as to guarantee a contribution to the
efforts of authorities engaged in the application of criminal law.50
In response to this demand raised by the police, the Commission organized a ‘cybercrime
hearing’ in Brussels on 27 November 2001.51 This meeting was preceded by a meeting of
experts, bringing together representatives of data protection authorities, the police and the
communications industry on 6 November. The single stated object of this assemblage was
the issue of the conservation of traffic-related data.52 What emerged from these discussions,
both the expert meeting and the cybercrime hearing of 27 November was:
• from the side of the industry, a dual point of view: that of the telecommunications
service providers,53 seeking to operate a regime of data conservation for the purposes
of their own information systems security and uneasy at having to cooperate ‘free of
charge’ with the frequently vague and poorly worded requirements of the authorities;
versus the interests of those bearers of copyright, who might like to make use of police
capabilities to better track down the sort of cyber-criminality which affects them,
namely the illegal pirating of copyrighted works on the web;
• that of data protection authorities,54 opposed to any conservation beyond the strict
necessities of invoicing and, in a more general sense, desirous of defining any procedural
measures in such a way as to ensure that they remain in perfect conformity with the
fundamental rights and liberties of citizens and with data protection law: to this end the
commissioners for data protection recalled the prohibition against any general measures
of surveillance and the necessity of providing a concrete justification for the retention
even of specific traffic-related data. Further, ‘the period of data retention and the
quantity of data conserved must be in proportion to the gravity of the criminal
infraction’. Finally, the data protection authorities underlined the sensitive nature of
traffic-related data inasmuch as they reveal the behaviour of an individual in an era of
ever more pervasive use of telecommunications media in daily life;
• that of the police, who consider it vitally important that they be able to resolve cases
thanks to the conservation of traffic- and location-related data and the cooperation,
willing or imposed by law, of telecommunications service providers. The authorities
stressed the absolute necessity of such cooperation for certain types of infraction,55
inasmuch as its absence in these cases would make it absolutely impossible for
them to detect the criminals. Finally, the police authorities justified the long list of
traffic-related data to be conserved as well as the period (between 6 months and 2 years).
The European authorities. The European authorities had to draw conclusions from these
debates by slightly modifying the text of the draft directive. Thus the final text expanded
those legitimate finalities for which network providers or telecommunications services may
process traffic- or location-related data. Article 6.5 adds the finality of fraud detection and
stipulates that the permission of the person concerned is no longer required before data is
processed with a view to commercialization through value added services, although the text
specifies that such processing must be limited to that which is essential to such activities.
Above all, Article 15 authorizes Member States to
… adopt legislative measures aimed at limiting the rights and obligations envisaged
under Articles 5 and 6, Article 8 paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4, and Article 9 of the present
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directive, whenever such a limitation constitutes a necessary measure for the safeguard-
ing of national security—that is to say, the security of the State—as well as public
defence and safety, or to assure the prevention, research, detection and pursuit of
criminal infractions or unauthorized use of electronic communications systems, such as
those envisaged under Article 13, paragraph 1 of the 95/46/CE directive.
To this end, the text adds
Member States may, among other things, envisage the conservation of data for a limited
period, when such conservation is justified by any of the motives included in the present
paragraph, within the respect of the general principles of Community law.56
This revised text leaves each Member State free to proceed as it wishes, while nonetheless
imposing observance of that which, according to Article 6 of the European Union Treaty
of 7 February 1992,57 constitutes a general principle of the European Union: the respect of
Human Rights and fundamental liberties
… such as they are guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Liberties, signed in Rome on the 4 November 1950 and such as they are to
be found expressed in the constitutional traditions of the Member States.
In other words, the text returns us to the obligation of Member States to respect Article 8
of the Convention and, according to the authors,58 the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg
Court taken in application of this same Article 8 as the privileged source of inspiration for
Community law.
However, the obligation to respect the Convention does not forbid divergence of
interpretation among the Member States with regard to the precise import to be given to
this reference. In this sense, it does not meet the objections of the service providers, uneasy
at the differences of interpretations that may be given by the governments of Member
States to a provision that is as vague as this one, as much with regard to the period of
conservation as with regard to the kind of data to be conserved or the modalities of that
conservation. The text also transgresses the principles of data protection as they are
interpreted by the data protection authorities and, finally, while agreeing with them as
regards the principle of data conservation, the text sends the judges and politicians back to
their national governments to obtain a national legalization of the obligations to conserve
and to cooperate on the part of infrastructure and service providers. Thus we note that, in
the context of a law on daily security measures59 from the 31 October, the French legislator
is expected to make use of the competences granted to national legislators within those
texts whose tenor we shall be subjecting to critical examination under Section 3. It suffices
to note here that the European Directive text confers upon the so-called ‘Group of Article
29’, composed of the representatives of the various data protection authorities, an import-
ant role in the interpretation to be given to the Community text, a role that may prevent
national divergences or over-lax interpretations.60
3. Critical Analysis—Possible Follow-up Paths Regarding the Legal Obligation to
Conserve Data and the Obligation upon Telecommunications Service Providers to
Cooperate with Authorities
The complements brought to paragraph 2 of Article 109bE by the cybercrime law resemble
an anticipatory transcription of a directive that is currently being approved. Our intention
Fight against Crime and Privacy Protection 259
in this last section is to suggest certain pathways for reflection that may serve as regulatory
guidelines, with the aim of ensuring the law its full effect, while at the same time offering
a review of the choices taken by our legislators.
Our first reflection is a preliminary one. It underlines the importance of the information
that is actually at issue when one speaks of localization-related or traffic-related data. The
notion of traffic-related data is defined by the European legislator as: ‘all data treated in the
course either of routing a communication via an electronic communications network or of
invoicing it’, and defines localization-related data as: ‘all the data carried in an electronic
communications network indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of
the user of a publicly accessible electronic communications service’.
Such data is infinite: it includes, beyond simple connection information, the duration of
our communications, the persons they are sent to, the sites we visit, the length of messages
exchanged, the technical characteristics of the message and of the user’s information
system. Meanwhile localization data can be used to reveal the exact position of the owner
of a cell-phone or GPS, even when it is not in use. Our increasingly intensive use of
information technologies, together with the expansion of value-added services that grow up
alongside them, betray the relationships we have with others, our movements, our tastes,
our convictions, our illnesses … leaving a vast web of traces with a diversity of actors in
a diversity of locations. Diverse, yes, but nonetheless vulnerable to being gathered and
reconnected, thanks to the inherent characteristics of increasingly powerful information
processing programmes, networks and systems.
Basically, the possibility of such access to a multiplicity of files and the ability to
interconnect the data content thus gathered creates very tempting opportunities to the
police and judicial authorities. Beyond this, we may raise the question as to whether it is
possible to maintain a distinction between traffic-related data and the actual content. This
distinction, which was always perfectly clear in the days of conventional telephone
communications, is no longer present in modern networks, where so-called traffic-related
data in fact reveals the very content of the communication, as is the case when accessing
a web page or site.
Should limits be introduced to such conservation, particular modalities imposed on these
operations and restrictions applied to the possible access of the authorities charged with the
pursuit of infractions? We may recall in this context the fundamental verdict of the
European Court of Human Rights, known as the Klass verdict of 6 September 1978, in
which the Court recognized the discretionary powers of Member States with regard to the
choice of surveillance systems to which they might have recourse, while underlining that
such discretionary power was not to be used arbitrarily:
Conscious of the danger inherent within such a law of undermining or even destroying
the very democracy it seeks to defend, the Court affirms that they [the Member States,
trans.] may not, in the name of the war against espionage and terrorism, simply
introduce any measure they might deem appropriate … . The principle question which
arises at this juncture, on the basis of Article 8, consists in knowing whether the terms
of paragraph 2 are sufficient to justify the unwarrantable interference so far observed. By
providing for an exception to a right that is guaranteed under the Convention, this
paragraph calls for the very strictest of interpretations. The power to place citizens under
secret surveillance, one so characteristic of the ‘police state’ is, according to the
Convention, tolerable only with regard to such measures as are strictly necessary for the
safeguarding of democratic institutions.61
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In its recommendation number 2/99, concerning the respect of privacy in the context of
telecommunications wiretapping,62 the Group for the protection of persons with regard to
the processing of data of a personal nature, summarized those guarantees deriving from the
relevant Council of Europe jurisprudence63 that are to be respected in surveillance situa-
tions.
It is incumbent upon national legislations, via such legal instruments as are accessible to
all citizens,64 to lay down, in language both precise and vigorous, the obligation to respect
all the following provisions:
• those authorities which are authorized to permit the legal interception of telecommu-
nications, the services authorized to carry out such interceptions and the legal basis for
their intervention,
• the finalities under which such interceptions may take place, which same should
permit an appreciation of their proportionality with respect to the national interests at
stake,65
• the prohibition of all exploratory or general telecommunications surveillance on a
large scale,66
• the circumstances and precise conditions (such as factual elements justifying the
measure and its duration) to which interceptions are submitted, within that respect of
the principle of specificity to which all incursions into the private life of citizens are
subject,67
• respect of the specificity principle, corollary of the prohibition of all exploratory and
general surveillance, implies, more precisely with regard to traffic-related data, that the
authorities may only have access to such information on a case by case basis, and in
no way as a general or proactive measure,
• the security measures applied in the storage and processing of such data, as well as
their period of conservation,
• with regard to those persons indirectly or randomly implicated in wiretapping mea-
sures,68 the particular guarantees to be brought to the processing of data of a personal
nature: notably the criteria justifying the conservation of data and the conditions
governing its communication to third parties,69
• the informing of the person under surveillance as soon as possible,
• the types of recourse available to the person under surveillance,70
• the modalities of the monitoring of these services by an independent control auth-
ority,71
• the rendering public—for example in the form of regular statistical reports,72 of
telecommunications interception policy effectively taking place,
• the precise conditions under which data may be communicated to third parties in the
framework of bilateral or multilateral accords.73
The application of these principles to measures that go beyond simple interception of
electronic communications to extend to the analysis of communications data prior to an
event raises a number of comments. The Belgian provision demands that all electronic
communication providers and operators store certain communications data without differ-
entiating between the persons concerned. It is difficult, in the light of such stipulations, not
to speak of general surveillance. Indeed one may be justified in fearing, as does the
European MP, Mr Cappato, reporting to the European parliament within the debate that
currently occupies us, that the person under surveillance, the ‘enemy’, does not in fact turn
out to be ‘the simple citizen surfing the net or making a phone call’. This critical remark
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on the legitimacy of such measures calls forth other reflections. One consists of distinguish-
ing between processes, depending on the original finality; a second raises questions on the
proportionality of the measures taken when compared to the dangers supposedly justifying
them; yet another raises the question of risks actually created by the processing carried out
under the stipulations at issue.
(a) Two Types of Processing
The general character of the Belgian text, in contrast to the French law,74 does not
distinguish data legitimately conserved by communications services operators and providers
in the framework of their own business activities, from other data whose conservation does
not fall a priori within this framework. As we have noticed, beyond the consent of the
person concerned, the European directive75 legitimizes data conservation for two finalities:
(a) that of invoicing and payment, and (b) that of the security of a particular operator’s or
provider’s own information system or network (hacker tracking, sabotage, viruses, etc).76
For data conserved and processed within the context of these finalities, its communi-
cation to the police authorities represents an ulterior process when viewed through the
optic of data protection legislation, compatibility with which augments as a function of the
following principles.
With regard to that data for which no legitimate conservation finality whatsoever exists
either with the operator or with the provider, the only legitimate finality resides within the
pursuit of infractions. In other words, in the second case, it is the public authority that is
directly responsible for the processing, the task of which it confers either upon the operator
or provider concerned, or upon another service, who will be charged with the collection of
data from different operators and/or providers. These providers, operators or services are,
in other words, only subcontractors to the public authority and, in accordance with Article
16 of the directive, are prohibited from making use of the data to any finality outside that
of the mission they have had conferred upon them.
In this second case therefore, conservation may only be legitimized within the context of
the objective imperatives of a police investigation.
We are States under the rule of law, and the Convention to which we adhere imposes
that those who call for the conservation of data must show the imperative social interest
of such a measure with regard to the rights and liberties thereby diminished. Where are
such justifications? The police authorities seemed singularly mute when questioned on this
issue at the meeting of experts convened by the EC to prepare this forum. They appeared
incapable of presenting anything other than opinions and news clippings where statistical,
social and psychological studies might have been able to demonstrate that the preparation
of grievous crimes is genuinely taking place via electronic communications media, and that
effective investigation of such crimes genuinely requires swift access to the data traces of
such use. Rather to the contrary, the confrontation between police authorities and service
providers revealed the lack of precision in the demands of the former, the tentative nature
of their efforts and the rarity with which such measures achieve any real success.
(b) The Legitimacy of Investigative Police Processing
The legitimacy of data processing rests on an examination of proportionality: do the risks
to the security of the State, or the protection of its citizens, justify an all-round regime of
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data tracing? Is the suggested means, namely the obligation bearing on telecommunications
operators and providers to conserve, necessary to the obtaining of such objectives?
In reply, the gravity of the crime is usually invoked as a justification for such incursions.
We pose the question: is there a strong and necessary link between the granting of such
means to the police authorities and the discovery of the criminals concerned?77 The answer
is no. Indeed, on the contrary, we may observe herein a means to facilitate detection of
other far more minor crimes directly linked to the use of communication technologies, such
as copyright violations of works available on the net,78 attempts to hack into computer
systems, fiscal fraud, etc. What should we think of an argument that rattles the skeleton of
terrorism, while in reality hitting quite different targets, such as white-collar crime, the
detection of whose authors hardly justifies recourse to such draconian measures as those
envisaged. Should we not in any event—and the previously cited resolution of the European
Parliament to combat child pornography79 alludes to this—only reserve the use of such
means as these for major infractions?
The rules of proportionality, necessity, foreseeability and legality of measures that
restrict our fundamental rights and liberties lead us in any case to demand that the law be
precise with regard to strict limits for the duration of such conservation, that it defines the
identification data concerned (would not user connection data and the moment of ‘trans-
action’ alone be sufficient?)80 as well as limiting the obligation to conserve to certain service
providers only, those who actually grant access to the network. In particular, a distinction
must be made between police operations involving data that is already conserved by
telecom companies within their normal activities, and such operations as involve other
data, such as is only gathered and conserved for police purposes.
The legislator is thus called upon to act here, as in other such situations, with ‘trembling
hands’, all the more so since the consequences of the stipulations at issue engender such
risks as those we shall go into below.
(c) The Risks of Such Processing
The first risk is that of regulatory deviation: even with the limits recalled above and clearly
affirmed at the outset, we may fear nonetheless that the ink will hardly have dried on this
law before its range begins to be progressively enlarged and those guarantees judged too
‘awkward’ begin to be ignored in the interest of increased effectiveness. Since the first
Belgian law on communications tapping, five other laws have succeeded it, each slightly
enlarging the scope of the police in the accessing of private communications. Thus
tomorrow we will surely hear it said that, since such vast reservoirs of data exist, should
they not be accessed more widely?81 This tendency, once an exception has been introduced,
to add some others, is most disquieting. How not to be struck by the wisdom of the
American ‘Patriot Act’, limiting as it does the total duration of such exceptional measures
to a period of 4 years, whereby we may note in addition that the obligation to conserve
data does not even feature among them.
Among the first negative reactions to such measures, lawyers have highlighted the danger
that, in their eyes, is represented by thus facilitating incursions on professional
confidentiality. The police will indeed have some considerable difficulty sorting out, from
among all the communications where they order intercepts, those covered by professional
confidentiality from the others.
Furthermore, we should not forget that reinforcing the regulations on cyber-surveillance
demands the existence of an independent monitoring authority. Yet are we sure that the
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control of investigations carried out in the field by highly trained police teams will be
effective, that the judicial authorities or specifically created monitoring bodies will always
be able to grasp the significance of the use being made of such new investigative tools?
Finally, does not the circulation of information within networks cooperating at an
international level demand a reinforcement of the democratic and juridical controls of
organizations such as Europol, Interpol, or of the future ‘Eurojust’ or Enfopol?82
Other deviatory risks were already underlined by the Belgian ‘Privacy’ Commission83
during the debate prior to voting the cybercrime law. The simple existence of such files
creates the risk of their abuse: providers and operators forced by law into such storage will
be tempted to benefit in other ways from their labours. Beyond questions of the security of
their own networks or services, we have reason to be nervous about the profiling of users
either for their own internal ends or for commercial purposes. Of course one might want
to consider confiding the management of such files to third parties specialized in conser-
vation, or all the more so to police authorities, but this would be substituting, for the
danger already described, that of the creation of gigantic mammoth files within which every
kind of interconnection becomes possible.
If the European Court of Human Rights considers that even the simple storage of data
for police finalities represents an attack on our liberties (see, for example, the Klaas, Lüdi,
Rotaru and Ammann cases), the consequences of processes induced by the legislation we
are dealing with here call for even more significant precautions. Indeed we have reason to
fear that police forces might pull the initial elements of their enquiry out of such vast
reserves of data, even prior to any other investigation (tracing of those persons close to the
‘scene of the crime’, list of their correspondents, last call in, last call out, etc.). Or even
worse, they might even be tempted to find within such files the means of attempting an
exploratory surveillance of so-called ‘risk groups’, those who frequent this or that website,
those who log in from a particular ‘hot’ location, suspected ‘terrorists’ or ‘hackers’, etc.
Thus it is absolutely necessary to
prohibit any setting-up by the security services of a general access to the information
conserved: consulting the conserved data should take place as part of a precisely
regulated procedure, on the basis of case-by-case requests. It should not be possible to
install any kind of permanent access to this data, such as would enable the introduction
of automated processes that could be used for general network surveillance. The physical
conservation of the data should be the sole responsibility of the companies concerned by
the obligation, who should strictly limit access.84
Conclusions85
The fight against cybercrime is affirmed as a priority without which society’s very survival
is at risk. Thus, in the name of security, and strengthened in an opinion that is constantly
being relayed and amplified by the media, politicians at the National or European level are
hurriedly preparing legislation to increase judicial and police powers in order to wage war
on cybercrime. Do we dare to remind them that Bin Laden’s cohorts, always assuming they
were the ones responsible for the events of the 11 September, seem to have had no recourse
whatsoever to the vaunted virtues of the Internet in the commission of their crimes?
What do these rapidly scribbled legislations envisage? They oblige the various electronic
communications service providers, whether private or public, to archive the data resulting
from our use of their services for a certain period, fixed by some at one year (Belgian
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legislation even sets this as the minimum!).86 This data archive is drawn up on the entire
population as a preventative measure, without the slightest concrete suspicion.
Without doubt, some would reply to those defenders of civil liberties, that their vaunted
freedoms are a luxury, one that we cannot afford when lives are in danger. They would add
that the honest citizen has nothing to fear from this surveillance that gives assurance to
their lives, unmasking the villain without frightening the good and the upright. Some would
even go so far as to say that such surveillance forces us to adopt behaviour more in
accordance with civil norms.
To those I would reply: there is no worse danger than this cyber-surveillance, which
hunts a man down in his most intimate space and raises within him a perpetual and
haunting fear of exposure.
Through a perverse reversal, this obsessive pre-eminence of the gaze of authority87 occurs
in the very name of that which it destroys. For the values behind which it shelters are
indeed of the highest order: justice, truth, liberty, democracy, due process of law, good
citizenship, integrity. Who cannot fail to see that this all too abrasive vision, by wearing
away all that it lingers upon, flays away to the bone certain principles that are among
the foundations of our lives together? When that just proportionality which should reign,
between the means made available to investigators and the actual goals of the investiga-
tion, is no longer respected, then a consecration of the process of investigation and
exposure begins to assume ‘method’ rather than ‘cause’ as its sole legitimacy.88
Furthermore, by artificially creating a sense of security, such measures absolve those who
employ them from questioning the rationale behind such crimes and from drawing up the
instruments of prevention policy that may offer a response to this rising tide of violence.
Everything is undertaken in the interest of criminalizing the act and defending society, and
no further questions need be asked. Yet we know well that crime will always either migrate
elsewhere, or become yet more violent, if its root causes are not genuinely addressed.
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comment réconcilier l’irréconciliable?’ in International Conference of 20 January 1999 organized
by the Committee R, in ‘Law of information and communication technologies’ Cahiers du Crid,
No 16, Brussels, Bruylant, 1999, p 235. On the notion of democracy stemming from this decree,
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censors’ available at http://www.wel.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/fouc1.html. The author
compares the police systems of electronic surveillance to a virtual ‘Panopticon’, which is much
more effective than the real one proposed by J Bentham.
88 B Frappat ‘La dictature de la transparence’ Etudes, 58, 1999.

